Description

The cybersecurity research community has identified a sophisticated spear-phishing campaign targeting individuals associated with research institutions in Taiwan. Tracked by Cisco Talos as UAT-11985, the operation aims to steal Google account credentials and multi-factor authentication (MFA) codes by exploiting trust in academic events and reputable organizations. Researchers first observed the activity in mid-2026 and noted signs of artificial intelligence (AI)-assisted content generation.The attackers use carefully designed emails that advertise conferences, seminars, and policy discussions related to geopolitical issues. These messages impersonate legitimate organizations, including the Taiwan European Union Centre, National Chengchi University's Institute of International Relations, and the Taiwan Research Institute. The emails generally contain background information about an event, personalized compliments intended to attract the recipient's attention, and registration details containing deceptive links. In addition to email-based attacks, the campaign employs QR code phishing, commonly known as quishing. The attackers alter authentic event posters by replacing their original QR codes with malicious ones. Consequently, individuals who encounter these posters may be redirected to fraudulent websites without receiving a phishing email. The malicious websites imitate Google Forms and prompt visitors to sign in to their Google accounts before proceeding. Victims are then presented with counterfeit Google login pages designed to collect usernames, passwords, and MFA codes. The operation uses an adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) framework that relays authentication requests to Google's genuine servers while intercepting sensitive information. Obfuscated JavaScript gathers browser and device details and communicates with attacker-controlled infrastructure through HTTP requests and WebSocket connections. This approach enables the attackers to monitor authentication activity and potentially bypass MFA protections by capturing verification challenges in real time. The phishing interface supports Simplified Chinese, Traditional Chinese, and English, suggesting a focus on Chinese-speaking targets. Overall, UAT-11985 demonstrates how institutional impersonation, personalized messaging, malicious QR codes, and real-time authentication interception can be combined to facilitate account compromise. The campaign highlights the importance of verifying event invitations, inspecting registration links, avoiding untrusted QR codes, and using phishing-resistant authentication methods, such as passkeys or security keys, to strengthen account security.