Description

The attack begins with a fraudulent PNB MetLife payment gateway webpage designed to closely mimic the insurer’s legitimate premium payment portal. Victims are typically lured via SMS phishing messages that claim pending premium dues or policy-related actions. The phishing pages are mobile-optimized, increasing success rates among smartphone users who rely heavily on UPI payment apps. In the first stage, victims are prompted to enter personal information such as name, policy number, and registered mobile number. This data is collected through malicious HTML forms and instantly exfiltrated using Telegram Bot API tokens embedded within the page source, allowing attackers to receive stolen information in real time without maintaining dedicated command-and-control infrastructure. Once initial details are harvested, victims are redirected to a fake UPI payment interface that dynamically generates QR codes and deep links for popular UPI applications like PhonePe, Paytm, and Google Pay. The system forces users to manually authorize payments, making the transaction appear legitimate while directing funds to attacker-controlled UPI IDs. In a more advanced stage, the phishing framework presents additional service options such as refunds, policy updates, or auto-debit activation. Selecting these options leads to a second phishing layer that requests bank account and card details, escalating the attack from simple UPI fraud to full-scale financial credential theft.