Description

LastPass published a report revealing additional information about threat actors accessing and stealing data from Amazon AWS cloud storage servers over two months as part of a coordinated second attack. The LastPass password vault was breached in December 2022, by threat actors stealing partially encrypted passwords and customer information. During another data breach, a senior DevOps engineer's computer was infected with a keylogger using information stolen, and a remote code execution vulnerability. According to LastPass, this second coordinated attack accessed Amazon S3 buckets encrypted with stolen data from the first breach. The threat actor targeted one of four LastPass DevOps engineers since only these four engineers had access to the decryption keys and installed a keylogger on the employee's device by exploiting a remote code execution flaw in a third-party media software package. After the employee authenticated with MFA, the threat actor captured the employee's master password and gained access to the DevOps engineer's LastPass corporate vault. As a result, the threat actor exported native corporate vault entries and the contents of shared folders, which contained encrypted secure notes with access and decryption keys that could be used to gain access to several cloud-based storage resources, including AWS S3 LastPass production backups and critical database backups. Moreover, the use of valid credentials made it difficult for LastPass' investigators to detect the threat actor's activity, allowing the threat actors to access and steal data from the company's cloud storage servers for over two months, between August 12, 2022, and October 26, 2022. However, when the threat actor attempted to use Cloud Identity and Access Management (IAM) roles for unauthorized purposes, LastPass detected the anomalous behavior through AWS GuardDuty alerts. Security policies have since been updated by adding logging and alerting, revoking certificates, rotating sensitive credentials, and enforcing stricter policies. Furthermore, the stolen data ranges from Multifactor Authentication (MFA) seeds, MFA API integration secrets, and Split Knowledge Component ("K2") Keys for Federated Business customers. It also includes On-demand, cloud-based development, and source code repositories that were accessed in Incident 1, among which were 14 of 200 software repositories, internal scripts containing LastPass secrets and certificates, and internal documentation providing technical information regarding the development environment. DevOps Secrets, Cloud-based backup storage, and LastPass MFA/Federation Database backups were accessed in Incident 2.