Description

In a highly destructive cyberattack, the hacking collective Lab-Dookhtegan crippled Iran’s maritime capabilities by infiltrating systems linked to 64 vessels managed by the National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) and the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL). Rather than compromising individual ships, attackers targeted Fanava Group, the central IT provider managing satellite communications across the fleet. The result was a fleet-wide blackout, severing critical links for navigation, port coordination, and emergency signaling during a time of escalating sanctions and geopolitical tensions. The initial infection exploited outdated iDirect satellite software (kernel 2.6.35) running on Linux terminals. With root access, the attackers mapped out the entire communications network using exposed MySQL databases that contained modem serials, vessel-specific configurations, and network IDs. This gave them a detailed blueprint to methodically compromise systems controlling the Falcon software, essential for maintaining satellite communications effectively isolating the ships from the world. As per logs, Lab-Dookhtegan had covert access since at least five months, testing control mechanisms and observing traffic through persistent "Node Down Notification" alerts. In August, the hackers launched a scorched-earth attack, executing destructive commands like ‘dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/mmcblk0p1 bs=1M’, overwriting system partitions to wipe navigation data, recovery tools, and configuration files. This rendered systems unrecoverable remotely. Alongside data destruction, they exfiltrated IP phone configs and plaintext passwords, enabling potential voice call interception or impersonation. Touska, Mahnam, and Zardis ships were affected, now stranded with no digital lifeline and need physical repairs at port. This breach exposes severe supply chain vulnerabilities and the dangers of legacy software in critical infrastructure. To prevent recurrence, organizations must adopt zero-trust architectures, enforce rigorous patching, and secure third-party vendor relationships to defend against similar high-impact, state-aligned cyber campaigns.