Description

Threat researchers are observing a significant concentration of malicious infrastructure within Chinese IP space, where tens of thousands of active command-and-control servers are operating across dozens of telecom and cloud providers. Rather than being evenly distributed, this activity is heavily clustered on a small number of large networks, creating dense hubs that support malware operations at scale. This pattern highlights a structural shift in how attackers build and maintain infrastructure, favoring reuse of reliable networks over constantly rotating domains. Detailed telemetry shows that command-and-control systems dominate this ecosystem, vastly outnumbering phishing sites and other forms of malicious hosting. While credential-harvesting pages and exposed directories are present, they represent a much smaller share of the overall footprint. The overwhelming focus on persistent C2 nodes indicates that these environments are primarily leveraged for long-term access, remote control, and post-compromise operations rather than short-lived lure campaigns. A limited set of service providers account for a disproportionate share of this activity, with major telecom and cloud platforms hosting thousands of C2 endpoints each. Likewise, a handful of malware families drive most of the abuse, ranging from large-scale botnets to commercial red-team frameworks and widely used remote access tools. This consistency makes infrastructure-level patterns more valuable for detection than individual indicators, which change frequently. Notably, the same hosting environments support a mix of cybercrime and state-aligned operations. Commodity malware, cryptomining, phishing frameworks, and advanced persistent threat campaigns coexist on overlapping networks, often side by side. This convergence turns shared infrastructure into a common staging ground for diverse threat actors, complicating attribution efforts and making traditional, indicator-driven defenses increasingly ineffective.